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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom in public economics holds that governments can lower end-
user prices by reducing commodity taxes. Relying on this insight, most countries
give newspapers preferential tax treatment in the form of low ad-valorem taxes.1
The rationale for such lenient tax treatment is that newspapers are considered to be
important providers of information, culture and language, and should be provided to
readers at low prices. Little or no attention has been devoted to the possibility that
preferential taxation may aﬀect newspapers’ choice of profiles (local versus global
news coverage, say, or political versus non-political) and their investments to become
more attractive to the readers (”quality investments").2
A particular feature of the newspaper business is that it derives income from
two groups of customers: advertisers and readers.3 Since advertisers find it more
attractive to place ads in a newspaper the larger its circulation, newspapers are a
prime example of a platform in a two-sided market.4 A key result in the literature
on two-sided markets is that the platform may find it profit-maximizing to charge
prices from one customer group that are below marginal costs (think about free
newspapers). Since profit-maximizing prices on the two sides of the market are
interlinked, taxation of newspapers may have unconventional eﬀects on strategic
variables.
1For example, in Germany newspapers are subject to a rate of 7% in contrast to the regular rate
of 16%, whilst countries like the UK, Denmark and Norway exempt newspapers from value-added
taxation (European Commission, 2004). Newspapers are also either fully or partially exempted
from sales taxes in a number of U.S. states.
2The lack of analysis of these issues is surprising, since taxation is known to aﬀect quality
choice and the intensity of competition. See e.g., Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001a,b) and
Delipalla and Keen (1992).
3The share of advertising in total revenue in the press industry diﬀers across countries, but is
typically around 50 percent. See Albarran and Chan-Olmstead (1998).
4See Evans (2003a,b) or Rochet and Tirole (2003) for examples and classifications of two-sided
platform firms.
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In this paper we argue that the preferential tax treatment of newspapers increases
media diversity, but may lead to higher newspaper prices and lower investments in
quality. In order to show this we use a Hotelling-type framework with two competing
newspapers and a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed along the unit line.
The newspapers’ choice of location on the line can be interpreted as describing their
profiles, and we consider a three-stage game. At stage 1 each newspaper decides on
its location on the Hotelling line and how much to invest in quality. At stage 2 the
ad level is determined, and ad-revenue is assumed to be proportional to the number
of readers. Then at stage 3 the newspapers compete in prices. A reduction in the ad-
valorem tax rate for newspapers implies that the profitability of selling newspapers
increases relative to the profitability of selling advertisements. As a consequence, it
becomes less imperative for the newspapers to attract a large audience in order to
sell advertising space. Instead, each newspaper wants to increase its earnings from
the reader side of the market. It can do so by choosing a profile that diﬀerentiates it
further away from its competitor in order to reduce the competitive pressure. Other
things equal, this allows the newspaper to charge higher prices from its readership
and to reduce quality investments.
Our analysis is related to a growing literature on the price-setting behavior of
firms in two-sided markets,5 but this literature typically abstracts from taxation
issues. The literature on commodity taxation, on the other hand, does not consider
two-sided markets.6 One exception is Kind et al (2006), who compare the eﬀects
of ad-valorem and specific taxes on newspapers in a monopoly setting. They find,
contrary to popular beliefs, that a lower ad-valorem tax may increase the price of
the newspaper and reduce sales, while a per-unit subsidy (or a lower specific tax)
has the opposite eﬀect. More closely related to our analysis is Gabszewicz et al
5See for instance Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2005),
and Armstrong (2005).
6E.g., Keen and Delipalla (1992), Dierickx, Matutes and Neven (1998) and Anderson et al
(2001a, 2001b). For a survey, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
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(2001, 2002), who use the Hotelling model to analyze how the size of the advertising
market aﬀects the political profiles of newspapers. They find that the larger the
ad-market, the more important it is for the newspapers to moderate their political
profile. Thereby the newspapers are better able to serve the mass market and raise
income from the advertising market.
This paper is organized as follows. The formal model is presented in Section 2,
and Section 3 derives the newspapers’ equilibrium prices, quality investments and
profile choices. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of changing the ad-valorem tax rate
levied on newspapers and ads. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We employ a standard Hotelling model with two competing media firms each selling
a newspaper to readers and ad-inserts to advertisers. The readers are uniformly
distributed along the unit line according to their political view; a consumer who is
located at point 0 in Figure 1 is extremely left-wing, whilst a consumer located at 1
is extremely right-wing. Consumers with more moderate views are located closer to
the center of the unit line. We assume that each reader buys the newspaper which
has the profile which best corresponds to his political view.
The political profiles of newspapers 1 and 2 are given by points x1 and x2,
respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1. Throughout the paper, we assume that
newspaper 2 is located to the right of newspaper 1; (1− x2) ≥ x1. The newspapers
are perfect (horizontal) substitutes if x1 + x2 = 1 and maximally (horizontally)
diﬀerentiated if x1 = x2 = 0.More generally, an increase in x1 and/or x2 means that
the newspapers become less horizontally diﬀerentiated, and vice versa.
0 1
x1 x2
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The further away a newspaper profile is from the ”ideal position” of a specific
reader, the smaller is his utility from reading it. We shall model this utility loss
by a distance cost parameter, t > 0. Letting pi ≥ 0 denote the price and qi ≥ 0
the quality level of newspaper i = 1, 2, we thus assume that the utility level of a
consumer located at point x who buys newspaper i is given by
U = v + qi − pi − t(x− di)2, (1)
where d1 = x1, d2 = 1 − x2, and v is a positive constant. The squaring of the last
term in (1) means that distance costs increase quadratically with the distance from
the most preferred location.
Consumers have unit demand, and we assume that the parameter v is suﬃciently
large to ensure complete market coverage. This means that each consumer buys
either newspaper 1 or newspaper 2. Let x˜ denote the location of the consumer who
is indiﬀerent between buying newspaper 1 and newspaper 2; v+q1−p1−t(x1−x˜)2 =
v+ q2− p2− t(1−x2− x˜)2. Consumers located to the left of x˜ (x < x˜) consequently
prefer newspaper 1, while consumers to the right of x˜ (x > x˜) prefer newspaper 2.
From this we find that demand Di for newspaper i equals
Di = xi +
1− x1 − x2
2
+
pj − pi
2t(1− x1 − x2)
+
qi − qj
2t(1− x1 − x2)
; i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j. (2)
Advertisers may buy inserts in either or both newspapers, and newspaper i’s
gross advertising income is given by Ai. The willingness to pay for advertising de-
pends on the number of readers and the advertising volume. We follow Peitz and
Valletti (2004) and Anderson and Coate (2005) in assuming that newspaper i faces
a simple downward-sloping demand curve for advertising per viewer. More specifi-
cally, letting ri be the price of advertising per viewer and ai the advertising volume,
we have
ri = α− βai (α, β > 0). (3)
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With Di readers, we consequently find that advertising income equals
Ai =
µ
α− βai
1 + T
− cA
¶
aiDi, (4)
where cA ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of adverts, and T ≥ 0 is the ad-valorem tax on
advertising. A higher α or a smaller β can be interpreted as though the size of the
ad market has increased.7
The profit level of newspaper i is given by
πi =
µ
pi
1 + τ
− cN
¶
Di +Ai −
φ
2
q2i , (5)
where τ ≥ 0 is the ad-valorem tax rate on newspaper sales and cN ≥ 0 is the marginal
cost of printing and distributing the newspaper. The last term in (5) represents
quality investment costs. We assume that the constant φ > 0 is suﬃciently large to
fulfill all second-order conditions for profit maximization.
3 Equilibrium
We use a sequential game with three stages, where at stage 1 each media platform
decides on its newspaper profile and level of quality investment. Then at stage 2
they choose advertising levels, while newspaper prices are determined at stage 3.8
Since newspaper prices and thus the number of copies sold are the outcome of the
final stage, the sequencing of the game implies that the platforms cannot commit
to a certain number of readers or write contracts with advertisers which depend on
the number of copies. However, we assume that the advertisers correctly anticipate
the number of readers. In practice a proxy for such anticipation is the use of weekly,
monthly and yearly circulation numbers that newspapers in most countries make
available for advertisers.
7An increase in α means that the willingness to pay for advertising becomes higher, while a
reduction in β is equivalent to an increase in the number of advertisers.
8Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002) study newspapers choice of political profile, but do not model
quality investments or taxes.
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Stage 3. Solving the game backwards, at stage 3 each newspaper takes profiles,
quality investments and advertising levels as given when it decides on the newspaper
price. Using (2) and (5) to solve ∂πi/∂pi = 0 we find
pi = cN(1 + τ) +
t (1− xi − xj) (3 + xi − xj)
3
+
qi − qj
3
, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j. (6)
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Equation (6) shows that the price of newspaper i depends positively on how
diﬀerentiated it is from its rival, both horizontally and vertically (∂pi/∂xi < 0 and
∂pi/∂qi > 0). We also see that the consumer price is increasing in newspaper taxes
(∂pi/∂τ > 0) for given locations and quality investments. Apparently, this lends
support to a public policy of imposing low value-added taxes on newspapers in
order to reduce their prices.
Stage 2. At the second stage each platform sells advertising space. Substituting
equations (4) and (6) into (5) and solving ∂πi/∂ai = 0, we find that the profit-
maximizing advertising volume equals
ai =
α− cA (1 + T )
2β
. (7)
From (7) we see that the level of advertising (ai) is decreasing in the ad-valorem tax
T, but increasing in the size of the advertising market (α). Making use of equation
(7) in (4), we can rewrite total advertising profit for each platform as
Ai =
[α− cA (1 + T )]2
4 (1 + T )β
Di. (8)
From equations (5) and (8) we can now derive revenue per reader Ri in each platform
as
Ri =
µ
pi
1 + τ
− cN
¶
+
[α− cA (1 + T )]2
4 (1 + T )β
,
where it is useful to note that revenue per reader falls following a rise in either of
the two ad-valorem tax rates.9
9It is easily verified that ∂R (τ , T ) /∂τ < 0 and ∂R (τ , T ) /∂dT < 0.
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Stage 1. At the first stage the two media platforms choose their profiles and
quality investment levels. The first-order conditions are found by solving ∂π∗i /∂xi =
∂π∗i /∂qi = 0 (i = 1, 2), where π∗i denotes profits given optimal prices and ad levels.
Starting with each newspaper’s choice of profile (horizontal dimension), we note
that
∂π∗i
∂xi
=
µ
pi
1 + τ
− cN
¶⎡⎢⎢⎣
direct eﬀectz}|{
∂Di
∂xi
+
strategic eﬀectz }| {
∂Di
∂pj
dpj
dxi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
| {z }
(I) Reader market (-)
+
∂Ai
∂Di
dDi
dxi| {z }
(II) Ad market (+)
. (9)
Terms (I) and (II) in equation (9) measure the marginal profit for newspaper i
in the reader and ad market, respectively, of choosing a profile which is closer to
that of the rival. Following the convention in the Hotelling literature, the two terms
in the square bracket of equation (9) are labelled the direct and the strategic eﬀect,
respectively. The direct eﬀect is positive, other things equal, and captures the fact
that the newspaper increases its market share by moving closer to its rival. However,
the smaller the distance between the firms, the lower is the price that the rival will
charge (dpj/dxi < 0). The strategic eﬀect is therefore negative.
It is well known from the principle of maximum diﬀerentiation that the strate-
gic eﬀect dominates over the demand eﬀect (e.g. Tirole, 1988). Expression (I) in
equation (9) is therefore negative. Expression (II), on the other hand, is positive
(see Appendix for a proof). The reason is that the newspaper gets a larger reader-
ship and consequently earns a higher profit in the ad market if it moves closer to
its rival. A large ad market may therefore give rise to the principle of minimum
diﬀerentiation, as discussed by Gabszewicz et al (2001, 2002).
Next, diﬀerentiating profit with respect to quality investments (the vertical di-
mension) we find
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∂π∗i
∂qi
=
µ
pi
1 + τ
− cN
¶⎡⎢⎢⎣
direct eﬀectz}|{
∂Di
∂qi
+
strategic eﬀectz }| {
∂Di
∂pj
dpj
dxi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
| {z }
(I): Reader market (+)
+
∂Ai
∂Di
dDi
dqi| {z }
(II): Ad market (+)
− φqi (10)
The square bracket in (10) shows that there is a direct and a strategic eﬀect also for
quality investments; demand for newspaper i increases if it invests more in quality,
but the rival will respond by reducing its newspaper price. The latter reduces
the positive eﬀect of quality improvements, but the total eﬀect is unambiguously
positive. Therefore Expression (I) in (10) is positive (see Appendix).
Expression (II) is positive, too. The reason is that a higher investment level
increases the size of the readership and thus revenue from ad-inserts: formally, we
have
∂Ai
∂Di
=
µ
α− βai
1 + T
− cA
¶
ai > 0
and
dDi
dqi
=
1
6t (1− x1 − x2)
> 0. (11)
Equation (11) contains the important message that dDi/dqi is increasing in x1 and
x2. This means that the demand-expanding eﬀect of a given quality improvement is
larger if the newspapers are good substitutes than if they are poor substitutes. The
intuitive explanation is that the better substitutes the newspapers are, the more
prone consumers are to shift from a low-quality to a high-quality newspaper. As we
shall see later, this gives rise to a business-stealing eﬀect which implies that each
newspaper has greater incentives to make quality investments in order to capture
readers from its rival the closer the newspapers are located on the Hotelling line.
In order to characterize the optimal profile and investment level we set (9) and
(10) equal to zero. This yields the first-order conditions
x∗i = −
1
4
+
(α− cA (1 + T ))2 (1 + τ)
16β (1 + T ) t
, (12)
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and
q∗i =
4tβ (1 + T )£
12tβ (1 + T )− (α− cA (1 + T ))2 (1 + τ)
¤
(1 + τ)φ
. (13)
In order for (12) and (13) to describe an equilibrium the second-order condition
for an optimummust hold (see Appendix). In addition, we must impose a restriction
on the willingness to pay for advertising (α) which guarantees that x∗i ∈ [0, 1/2].
This restriction amounts to requiring
α ≤ α ≤ α¯, (14)
α ≡
r
4tβ(1 + T )
1 + τ
+ cA(1 + T ),
α¯ ≡
r
12tβ (1 + T )
1 + τ
+ cA (1 + T ) .
If demand for advertising is suﬃciently small (α 6 α) equation (12) implies that the
newspapers will be located at each end of the Hotelling line. However, the larger the
advertising market, the closer the firms will locate to each other, and in the limit
when α approaches α¯ we have xi = 1/2.
The advertisers do not care about the quality of the newspaper per se; their only
concern is the number of readers. The size of the ad market therefore has no direct
eﬀect on the firms’ investment incentives. However, the newspapers will be less
diﬀerentiated the larger the advertising market, and we know from equation (11)
that less horizontal diﬀerentiation makes the business stealing motive for investing
in quality improvements stronger. This explains why equation (13) implies that q∗i
is increasing in the size of the advertising market.
Summing up, we have:
Proposition 1 The newspapers will be less diﬀerentiated and make higher qual-
ity investments the larger the advertising market (dx∗i /dα > 0, dx∗i /dβ < 0 and
dq∗i /dα > 0, dq∗i /dβ < 0).
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The equilibrium values in the consumer and advertising markets are now found
by inserting for (12) and (13) into (2), (6) and (8):
p∗i =
3
2
t+ cN (1 + τ)−
(α− cA (1 + T ))2 (1 + τ)
8β (1 + T )
(15)
A∗i =
(α− cA (1 + T ))2
8β (1 + T )
(16)
From (15) we immediately see the following:
Corollary 1 The newspaper price is decreasing in the size of the advertising market.
Corollary 1 simply reflects the fact that each media firm is willing to accept a
low newspaper price in order to attract a larger number of readers if the advertising
market is very profitable.
4 Eﬀects of taxing media products
This section analyzes how higher ad-valorem taxes aﬀect the newspapers’ strategic
choices. For this purpose, we treat locations, quality investments and newspaper
prices as functions of the two exogenous tax rates, i.e., x∗i (τ , T ), q∗i (τ , T ), p∗i (τ , T ).
Let us first consider the newspapers’ choice of location. From equation (12) we find
that
dx∗i
dτ
=
[α− cA (1 + T )]2
16tβ (1 + T )
> 0. (17)
Equation (17) reflects the fact that higher value-added taxes on newspapers make
the advertising market relatively more important for the media firms. Thereby it
becomes more valuable to attract a large number of readers, inducing each newspaper
to locate closer to its competitor. This relocation eﬀect is clearly stronger the larger
is the advertising market (higher α, smaller β).
What happens to the newspaper price if τ goes up? Diﬀerentiating equation (15)
we find
dp∗i
dτ
= cN −
[α− cA (1 + T )]2
8β (1 + T )
. (18)
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As in a one-sided market, the direct eﬀect of a higher τ is to increase the newspaper
price if marginal costs are positive. This is captured by the first term on the right-
hand side of (18). However, the fact that the newspapers endogenously become less
horizontally diﬀerentiated when τ increases, means that there will be tougher price
competition between the newspapers. This in turn tends to reduce the newspaper
price, as shown by the second term on the right-hand side of (18).
The net eﬀect depends on the relative strength of these two eﬀects, and cannot
be signed in general. However, equation (18) shows that the newspaper price is more
likely to dominate and lead to a price reduction the larger the advertising market
(because the relocation eﬀect is then stronger). Specifically, it can be shown that
dp∗i /dτ > 0 if α > α1 ≡
p
8β (1 + T ) cN + cA (1 + T ). This condition holds always
if marginal costs are equal to zero (cA = cN = 0).
The consequences of a higher τ for the quality level of the newspapers are also
ambiguous. On the one hand, the profit margin of the newspapers falls subsequent
to a tax increase, other things equal. This has a negative eﬀect on the incentives to
invest in quality improvements. On the other hand, we have seen that the newspa-
pers will locate closer to each other if τ increases. To clearly see the implications of
the latter for quality investments, we diﬀerentiate equation (13) to find
dq∗i
dτ
= 3 (1 + τ)φq2i
µ
8
3
dx∗i
dτ
− 1
1 + τ
¶
. (19)
The larger dx∗i /dτ , the less diﬀerentiated the newspapers will be, and the stronger
each newspaper’s incentive will be to invest in quality in order to capture readers
from its rival (business-stealing eﬀect). This explains why the change in quality
investments is proportional to the relocation eﬀect. Since the relocation eﬀect in
turn is stronger the larger the advertising market, we find that a higher newspaper
tax increases quality investments if the ad market is suﬃciently large - combining
equations (17) and (19) we have dq∗i /dτ > 0 if α > α2 ≡
q
6β(1+T )t
1+τ + cA (1 + T ).
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We can now state:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the value-added tax on newspapers increases. Then
• the newspapers become less diﬀerentiated (dx∗i /dτ > 0),
• the newspaper price falls if α > α1 (dp∗i /dτ < 0), and
• the quality level increases if α > α2 (dq∗i /dτ > 0).
In most countries newspapers are taxed at a reduced rate or fully exempt from
taxation in order to lower their prices. Proposition 3 shows that a fall in the ad-
valorem tax leads to greater media diversity, but may imply higher newspaper prices
and lower investments in quality. Although the Hotelling duopoly model does not
allow us to analyze the eﬀects on circulation, previous studies in the context of
monopoly with general functional forms show that a reduction in the VAT rate
may increase the newspaper price and lower the number of copies sold (see Kind
et al (2006)).10 The same can be shown to apply for a Hotelling monopoly model
where the market is uncovered. This indicates that there might be a policy trade-oﬀ
between achieving media diversity, high quality investments and large newspaper
circulations.
Figure 2, which measures the size of the advertising market as captured by α
on the horizontal axis, provides a numerical illustration of Proposition 2. With the
chosen parameter values (see Appendix) we find that dp∗i /dτ < 0 if α >
4
5
√
5 ≈ 1.79,
while the upward-sloping curve shows that dq∗i /dτ > 0 if α >
√
3 ≈ 1.73.11 For
α > 4
5
√
5 a higher ad-valorem tax will thus reduce the newspaper price and increase
quality investments.
10We use the terms VAT and ad-valorem tax interchangeably.
11As shown by equation (17), x∗i is monotonically increasing in α. For the parameter values used
in Figure 2, we have x∗i = −1/4 + α2/8. This means that x∗i = 0.111 at α = 1.7 and x∗i = 0.155 at
α = 1.8.
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Figure 2: Value added taxes on newspapers: price and quality responses.
Finally, let us consider the eﬀects of increasing T . Higher ad-valorem taxes on
ads make the advertising market relatively less profitable for the newspapers, and
will therefore lead to increased diﬀerentiation:
dx∗i
dT
= −
¡
α2 − c2A (1 + T )
2¢ (1 + τ)
16tβ (1 + T )2
< 0.
Recall that taxes on ads do not enter the newspaper price pi at the final stage
of the game; see equation (6). We nonetheless find that higher advertising taxes
increase the newspaper price. This is due to the relocation eﬀect: since the newspa-
pers end up being more diﬀerentiated if T increases, the competitive pressure falls.
This unambiguously allows the newspapers to increase their prices. Additionally,
the lower competitive pressure reduces the newspapers’ incentive to make quality
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investments. We therefore have
dp∗i
dT
=
(1 + τ)(α− cA(1 + T ))(2cA + (1 + T ))
1 + T
> 0
dq∗i
dT
= − 4tβ ((α− cA(1 + T ))
2 + 2cA(1 + T )
2)
φ (12tβ(1 + T )− (α− cA(1 + T ))2(1 + τ))
< 0.
The eﬀects of taxing advertising can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the value-added tax on ads increases. Then
• the newspapers become more diﬀerentiated (dx∗i /dT < 0),
• the newspaper price increases (dp∗i /dT > 0), and
• quality investments fall (dq∗i /dT < 0).
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 we see that the two taxes have very diﬀerent
eﬀects. A reduction in the ad-valorem tax on newspapers (the reduced-rate regime
in many countries) makes each platform diﬀerentiate its profile further. In contrast,
a fall in the tax on ads has the opposite eﬀect; it leads to less diﬀerentiation. The im-
pact on quality and the newspaper price may also be of opposite signs, but depends
on the importance of advertising as a source of revenue.
5 Concluding remarks
Advertising supported media such as newspapers is based on a two-sided business
model. The newspaper creates content that is used to attract readers. The readers
are then used to attract advertisers. This interrelationship is of importance when
policy implications are considered. Governments in democratic countries typically
consider media pluralism as a benefit, and in this paper we have shown how a
reduced-rate regime for newspapers makes the press industry become more diﬀeren-
tiated. Contrary to what one should expect, however, the basic insight in one-sided
markets that a fall in taxes lowers end-user prices, need not hold. On the contrary,
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we show that a fall in the VAT rate on newspapers may lead to a higher end-user
price on newspapers. Our results further suggest that there might be a trade-oﬀ
between having a press industry that is diﬀerentiated in profile and one that has
high quality investments if the VAT rate is the government’s only instrument.
6 Appendix
Proof that ∂Ai∂Di
dDi
dxi
> 0 (equation (9))
Diﬀerentiating equation (8) with respect to Di we find that
∂Ai
∂Di
=
µ
α− βai
1 + T
− cA
¶
ai. (20)
Inserting (6) into (2) it further follows that
dDi
dxi
=
1
6
t (1− x1 − x2)2 − qj + qj
t (1− x1 − x2)2
.
In a symmetric equilibrium (xi = xj and qi = qj) we consequently haveµ
∂Ai
∂Di
dDi
dxi
¶¯¯¯¯
sym
=
µ
α− βai
1 + T
− cA
¶
ai
6
> 0.
Proof that ∂π
∗
i
∂qi
> 0 (equation (10))
Diﬀerentiating πi with respect to qi and using the envelope theorem (which implies
that (∂πi/∂pi) / (∂pi/∂qi) = 0) we have
∂π∗i
∂qi
=
µ
p1
1 + τ
− cN
¶µ
∂Di
∂qi
+
∂Di
∂pj
dpj
dqi
¶
+
∂Ai
∂Di
dDi
dqi
− φqi. (21)
We further find µ
∂Di
∂qi
+
∂Di
∂pj
dpj
dqi
¶¯¯¯¯
sym
=
1
3t (1− 2xi)
> 0
and
∂Ai
∂Di
dDi
dqi
¯¯¯¯
sym
=
µ
α− βa1
1 + T
− cA
¶
ai
2t (1− 2xi)
> 0.
The two first terms on the right-hand side of (10) are thus positive. Q.E.D.
Second-order conditions
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The second-order conditions for the third and the second stage are straight forwardly
calculated. However, the second-order conditions for the first stage are more complex
(and will obviously not be satisfied if φ is too small), and require that
∂2πi
∂q2i
= −9tφ (1 + τ) (1− x1 − x2)− 1
9 (1 + τ) t (1− x1 − x2)
< 0 (22)
0 >
∂2πi
∂x2i
= −
(
4βt2 (5 + 3xi − xj) (1− x1 − x2)3 (1 + T )
36tβ (1 + τ) (1− x1 − x2)3 (1 + T )
(23)
−
(qi − qj)
¡
4β (1 + T ) (qi − qj)− 3 (α− cA (1 + T ))2 (1 + τ)
¢
36tβ (1 + τ) (1− x1 − x2)3 (1 + T )
)
and µ
∂2πi
∂q2i
¶µ
∂2πi
∂x2i
¶
−
µ
∂2πi
∂qi∂xi
¶2
> 0 (24)
whereµ
∂2πi
∂qi∂xi
¶2
=
¡
8β (1 + T )
¡
(qi − qj) + t (1− x1 − x2)2
¢
+ 3 (A− cN (1 + T ))2 (1 + τ)
¢2
5184 (1 + τ)2 t2 (1− x1 − x2)4 (1 + T )2 β2
.
(25)
A necessary condition for the second-order conditions to be satisfied is that φ >
[9t (1 + τ) (1− x1 − x2)]−1 . Otherwise, the costs if quality investments are so low
that ∂2πi/∂q2i is non-negative.
Parameter values Parameter values in Figure 2: T = τ = cN = 0, t = 1/2, φ =
2, cA = 4/10 and β = 1. Using equations (22) - (25) it can be verified that all
second-order conditions are satisfied within the range of α shown in the figure.
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